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Abstract. This article provides commentary on the American Civil Liberty Union's (ACLU) criticisms of the 
Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System (CAPS) that was developed under the auspices of the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to support aviation security. 
 
Profiling in security screening programs usually denotes the development and employment of criteria 
that identify certain types of people as being at greater risk to perpetrate behavior with security-
damaging consequences. The potential classes of criteria are many: intrapsychic, physical, demographic, 
environmental, social, and cultural are only a few. In a critique of profiling, one may address the criteria 
themselves, as well as how they are employed within the security screening program. 
 
The Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System (CAPS) is an aviation security screening system 
developed through a recommendation by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 
and under the auspices of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). It is largely focused on identifying 
people at greater risk to perpetrate aviation terrorism and other behaviors with noxious aviation safety 
and security consequences. In complaining about CAPS, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has 
addressed both CAPS criteria and how they are employed. 
 
ACLU Complaint 1. Profiling is speculative and does nothing to ensure safety. IBPP Commentary. If this 
means that profiling is not a sure thing, then sure, we agree. But reputable profilers never make such a 
claim. Instead, they labor to demonstrate incremental attenuation of certain security risks and/or some 
increase in security benefits. This demonstration comprises both descriptive and inferential statistical 
analysis, as well as conceptual analysis. In the United States (US), the success of profiling for the 
screening of large numbers of people in security situations goes back at least as far as World War I. In 
fact, successful profiling for security screening occurred thousands of years ago and can be identified in 
the history of bureaucracies in China. Finally, the history of profiling for security screening clearly 
suggests that profilers can more validly screen out risk than screen in its converse. The former is exactly 
what CAPS addresses. 
 
ACLU Complaint 2. The criteria of profiling do not individually suggest evidence of behavior damaging to 
security. IBPP Commentary. Again, if this complaint means that profiling is not a sure thing, then see 
above. On the other hand, if this complaint suggests that for a set of criteria to be useful, then each 
criterion must be directly linked to security risk, we disagree. A criterion--itself not directly related to 
security risk--may be useful as a moderating, modifying, or otherwise intermediary variable in a nexus of 
criteria that may have very significant validities--e.g., concurrent, predictive, construct, or 
discriminative--towards behavior damaging to security. If instead the complaint is that profilers can only 
demonstrate significant validity of criteria in general--for samples and populations-and not for specific 
individuals, again we disagree. Through statistical and conceptual analysis, profilers may render 
competent opinions of likelihood for a specific behavior for both groups of people and individuals. The 
same criterion may well have different likelihoods for different populations, different samples, different 
individuals. The same criterion may be directly related in some cases, indirectly or not at all related in 
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others. Different criteria may have similar likelihoods for different populations, samples, and individuals. 
Yet, the validity Issue is always the same: the generalization of a generalization to a particular. 
(However, we admit that the Issue of data derived from groups and applied to individuals is a "hot 
topic." Coincidentally, it will be the focus of a symposium next month at an annual gathering of experts 
in personality assessment (Ganellen, 1998).) 
 
ACLU Complaint 3. Profiling can involve the "troublesome maintenance and evaluation" of personal 
information about passengers and their travel using criteria that are kept secret for "security reasons." 
IBPP Commentary. If by troublesome, the ACLU is implying that information about people should notbe 
employed in making decisions about them--well, we don't believe that ACLU officials and members 
follow this approach in selecting and managing their own people, attempting to help others, as well as 
leading their own lives. If the complaint instead is that security criteria should not be held "secret" but 
promulgated to the world--well, besides the futility of such an enterprise, we again don't believe that 
ACLU members follow this approach in their own professional and personal lives. If the complaint is that 
personal information is evaluated invalidly, this would be a significant concern. But the ACLU presents 
no empirical data or conceptual analysis to support this position. On the other hand, if the Issue is that 
security officials do not have the requisite ability and/or motivation to securely maintain information, 
again this would be a significant concern--to the Department of Transportation (DOT) (that controls 
FAA), the FAA, and the public discourse on profiling and CAPS. But then the ACLU complaint becomes 
recursive, for exactly the same Issues of criteria and incremental validity as described above become 
germane to developing and managing better personnel, operations, physical, and communications 
security systems for aviation-related security officials. 
 
ACLU Complaint 4. CAPS has or will have an unequal impact on some passengers who will be identified 
as greater security risks based on race, religion, or national origin. In essence, CAPS is or will be 
discriminatory. IBPP Commentary. The very phenomena of conscious and subconscious sensation, 
perception, and judgment--among other inferred intrapsychic processes--are discriminative. In other 
words, they intrinsically lead to unequal impact on their targets--animate and inanimate. This unequal 
impact also comprises behaviors associated with these intrapsychic processes towards their targets and 
the consequences of these behaviors. 
 
Does a discriminative process necessarily lead to a discriminatory one? The IBPP opinion is only if an 
individual is being treated differently solely because of--in this case--race, religion, or national origin. But 
is this happening with CAPS? Although the CAPS criteria have not been released to the general public, 
DOT and FAA spokespersons assert that race, religion, and national origin are not criteria--that, in fact, 
the criteria deal with behaviors directly and indirectly deduced from airline ticketing data. The ACLU 
counter to this assertion is that behaviors may be directly or indirectly related to race, religion, or 
national origin. Therefore, behavioral profiling is inherently discriminatory. The problem with the ACLU 
counter is that the behaviors intimated to be criteria by DOT and the FAA data are not exclusively 
related to a particular race, religion, or national origin. The best the ACLU can do is state that certain 
behaviors may have a higher incidence or prevalence in some groups than others. Thus, if CAPS does not 
differentially treat different people who manifest the same behavioral data--and DOT and the FAA assert 
that this is the case--the discriminatory accusation by the ACLU becomes very difficult to reasonably 
make. To buttress the accusation, the ACLU might need to posit some quantitative threshold of 
incidence and prevalence of a behavior or nexus of behaviors for a specific group above which 
discriminatory practice would be said to occur. And given the vagaries of life, the actual incidences and 
prevalences would be continuously changing--necessitating the employment of thousands of 
statisticians in an ever growing bureaucracy. ACLU might better profit from ensuring an independent 
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evaluation of the statistical and conceptual analysis that led to CAPS based on state-of-the-art profiling 
concepts and procedures. 
 
Some further comments on the consequences of profiling criteria and CAPS. Would the ACLU maintain 
that even a perfect profiling system--100% true positives and true negatives--would be discriminatory 
because terrorists would be treated differently than nonterrorists, other criminals from noncriminals? 
Such a complaint would exemplify a regrettable, vapid, craven, and recurrent tendency throughout 
history for some observers to reify a concept or ideology--e.g., civil liberties--even if the reification leads 
to consequences directly and hugely contrary to those linked to what is reified--e.g., a horrible and 
unjust death. (We see such a tendency today in discourse over formal democratic procedure and human 
rights in Africa (Gourevitch, 1997).) 
 
But, finally, is the Issue not differential treatment per se, but differential treatment based only on 
certain criteria, viz., race, religion, or national origin? That is, other criteria leading to differential 
treatment would be tolerable, but not race, religion, and national origin. The necessary legal and, 
perhaps, philosophical analysis would cover not only whether discriminative and discriminatory are 
identical--as would be salient if the ACLU is objecting to all differential treatment--but also whether 
race, religion, and national origin are imbued with some inherent essence that renders discriminatory 
acts based on them more objectionable than the same acts based on other variables. The ACLU has not 
provided such an analysis. 
 
ACLU Complaint 5. CAPS will engender maltreatment and abusive security screening incidents. (Part of 
this complaint is based on data collected by the ACLU. It alleges to have collected more complaints of 
discriminatory security screening from passengers traveling via Northwest Airlines--which has tested 
CAPS in some airports for over one year--than other airlines.) IBPP Commentary. This complaint has less 
to do with profiling criteria than with implementation of a security screening program regardless of 
criteria validity. It probably is safe to posit that all human systems--security screening networks, service 
bureaucracies, industrial conglomerates, sensitivity groups--can be characterized by a fluctuating base 
rate of maltreatment and abusive incidents. So can systems advocated or at least tolerated by the ACLU-
-the so-called full "luggage match" system, as well as systems employing x-ray machines and other 
technological devices that screen everyone's checked luggage. Does the ACLU have data to back up a 
claim that CAPS somehow generates more noxious incidents than other screening systems? Its data on 
Northwest has been countered by reports that the complaints were at sites where CAPS was not yet in 
use. Even if these reports are bogus, however, the ACLU data might have little or nothing to do with 
CAPS and might be no more than an artifact. Moreover, the complaint and its supporting data conflate 
maltreatment and abuse with discrimination. Certainly, the first two can occur without the third. 
 
ACLU Complaint 6. Criminals--including those who fit the profiling criteria--may find CAPS easy to evade 
by duping a passenger who does not fit the profile into carrying a bomb. IBPP Commentary. This 
complaint somewhat captures the essence of theatre of the absurd. Do criminals dupe noncriminals into 
carrying bombs? Sure. Do criminals, knowing that they fit the profile, dupe someone who doesn't fit the 
profile? No, because the criminals can't know what they don't know--unless the ACLU succeeds at 
forcing the CAPS to "spill the beans," i.e., interjecting the profile criteria into public discourse…or unless 
the criminals succeed in breaking through the security protecting the criteria. This latter case is quite 
probable among more sophisticated threats to aviation safety and security. However, the criteria would 
still be useful against criminals not having access to them. What's more, the "spy-counterspy" process of 
security improvement, countersecurity improvement, and so on is a recurrent feature of history and 
should not dissuade one from taking the quest for improved security seriously as opposed to just giving 
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up. Again, the ACLU seems to be demanding a perfect system or no system--even if elsewhere the ACLU 
might well imply or even posit that a perfect system may be discriminatory and, therefore, should be 
inoperative. Here the ACLU might more profitably advocate independent evaluation not only of criteria 
validity and appropriateness of program employment, but also myriad cost-benefit Issues. 
 
ACLU Complaint 7. DOT has failed to establish its own means of adequately collecting and tracking 
passenger complaints about CAPS and to set up an independent monitoring panel to review complaints. 
IBPP Commentary. If true, this can be alleviated easily. 
 
Let's close with a complaint of our own. IBPP Complaint 1. The ACLU has developed a passenger profiling 
complaint form on the world wide web to collect further data bearing on mistreatment and abusive or 
discriminatory security screening by airport security personnel. The ACLU states that the data will be 
kept confidential upon request. IBPP Commentary. To best explore the effects of security screening in 
general or CAPS specifically, the ACLU's form should be structured to elicit data on good and bad 
treatment, respect and abuse, equitable and discriminatory contacts. The public could be best served if 
ACLU collected data on what supports as well as what violates rights--what should be kept, increased, 
decreased, or done away with in specific situations and in general. As it now stands, however, the 
ACLU's form reads like a highly slanted screed more than a so-called objective questionnaire. (1) It 
begins with a large-lettered expletive--"Act Now!"--closely aligned with a letterhead bearing the phrase 
"Freedom Network" and the word "Complaint." This stimulus configuration quite probably represents a 
significant biasing towards dire aggrievedness and exploitation on the part of the complainant that may 
not be preexisting before contact with the form. (2) Terms differing in evaluative content--"singled out," 
"selected," and "subjected"--are used interchangeably throughout the series of questions, while abuse, 
maltreatment, and discrimination are lumped together. To be charitable, this complicates data analysis. 
(3) The question "Do you believe you were selected for heightened security measures based on 
constitutionally-protected characteristics, such as your race, religion, or national origin?" does not even 
attempt to discriminate between discriminative and discriminatory acts. (4) The ACLU has publicly 
stated that it will protect the confidentiality of the complainants, but the form itself clearly is biased 
towards persuading complainants to mark the "non-confidential" box to "allow us maximum flexibility in 
using the information you provide." (5) The form contains a "SOUND OFF" section that encourages 
complainants to "tell the Department of Transportation what happened to you and why you believe 
what you experienced was abusive, embarassing (sic) or discriminatory." This phrasing lumps together 
noxious events that may have nothing to do with discrimination and events that are perceived to be 
discriminatory. (See (2) above.) (6) Just as the ACLU has attacked DOT and the FAA for neglecting to 
develop appropriate procedures of collecting, tracking, and reviewing complaints, the ACLU itself is 
using the number of complaints elicited by its form to attack CAPS without publicly communicating any 
attempt to evaluate the veracity and relevance of these complaints. 
 
Conclusion. Attempts to contribute towards increased aviation safety and security should be 
encouraged and carefully evaluated. The ACLU complaints about CAPS should be considered in this light. 
So should counters to the ACLU complaints like one cited by New York Times reporter Matthew Wald 
and attributed to a spokesman for the Air Transport Association: "There is no way the system operates 
that it could discriminate against people." Remember: whether there's a will or not, there's a way. (See 
ACLU: Aviation Profiling Complaint Form, http://www.aclu.org/forms/complain_aviation.html; Aviation 
terrorism: The development of terrorist profiles. (February 14, 1997). IBPP, 1(12); Clausing, J. (January 3, 
1998). Airlines' computerized profiling system prompts complaint campaign on Web. The New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com; As airlines debut profiling system, ACLU launches web complaint form. 
(December 31, 1997). ACLU Press Release; Fairbank, J.K. (1992). China: A new history (pp. 46-71). 
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